By Jonathan Bennett
In this learn of occasions and their locations in our language and idea, Bennett propounds and defends perspectives approximately what sort of merchandise an occasion is, how the language of occasions works, and approximately how those subject matters are interrelated. He argues that the majority of the supposedly metaphysical literature is absolutely concerning the semantics in their names, and that the genuine metaphysic of events--known via Leibniz and rediscovered through Kim--has no longer been universally permitted since it has been tarred with the comb of a fake semantic theory.
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Extra resources for Events and their Names
Iv) We have arrived at this: C(e 1 ,e 2 ) just in case there is a continuous series of events e 1 , . , e 2 in which each successive pair e i , e j satisfies the following: There are properties F and F′ such that: F(e i ) and F′(e j ) and L entails that every F event is followed by an F′ event. But if F and F′ are intrinsic features of events, involving no relations to anything else, it will seldom be a causal truth that F events are followed by F′ events: it hardly ever happens that one intrinsic kind of event leads to another except by virtue of the circumstances being right.
Now, to call an event "a cause", tout court, is to say -28- little or nothing about it, for possibly all events are causes. For the same reason, we have no occasion to generalize about all causes. What we should be looking at, then, are uses of phrases of the form "cause(s) of e". For example: The Versailles Treaty was a cause of World War II; He is writing a book on the causes of the Reformation; One of the causes of the landslide was also a cause of the flood. That third example is a heroic attempt to find a plausible sentence in which the subject noun phrase includes "cause(s) of .
My throwing a lighted match into the gasoline drum topped up a set of jointly sufficient conditions for the house to be in ruins an hour later; and the house was in ruins an hour later; but that is because a bomb was dropped onto it just as I threw the match, so that the fact that I threw the match was not a cause of the house's being destroyed. How can we strengthen the sufficient conditions for C(f P ,f Q ) so as to exclude this unwanted case? Not by saying that f P is a necessary part of an operative sufficient condition for f Q 's obtaining, for that amounts to saying that f P is a necessary part of something that brings it about that f Q obtains, that is, of something x such that C(x,f Q )--which is the very notion we are trying to analyze!